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Abstract
Using a world trade model with India subdivided into states, the paper examines how regional 
disparities are affected by domestic inter-state trade as well as international trade. According to 
the analysis, international liberalisation promotes decentralisation and convergence, not diver-
gence, so trade is not to blame for India’s growing regional disparities. High economic growth 
within India makes domestic markets more important and the geographical effect of this is op-
posite to that of globalisation. This may counterbalance the geographical impact of international 
liberalisation and explain why recent changes in geographical clustering in India are limited. The 
empirical results are consistent with this. They also indicate that Indian services expansion is 
largely driven by increases in domestic demand due to growth, and that domestic market integra-
tion is essential for India’s manufacturing sector. We argue that for larger nations, the domestic 
inter-regional trade is important and India should have a trade policy that addresses domestic as 
well as international market integration.
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1. Introduction* 
While India’s recent growth acceleration has contributed to poverty 
reduction, it has coincided with a significant increase in regional dis-
parities and important states are still lagging behind with low income 
levels and massive poverty. In 2006, the per capita income levels of 
the poorest Indian states (Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh) were 
at 36-63% of the all-India average, while the richest states (Delhi, 
Goa, Chandigarh) were in the range 240-353%. The richest (Chandi-
garh) had ten times the income of the poorest (Bihar).  
 
The increase in regional disparities is something that India shares with 
other emerging nations. For example, China experienced a similar in-
crease until 2003 (Melchior 2010b). According to Williamson (1965), 
regional disparities tend to increase during early stages of develop-
ment and decrease thereafter. Brülhart and Sbergami (2009) find some 
support for this “U-shape” hypothesis, and conclude that the turning 
point occurs at a per capita income level of about 10 000 current USD.  
 
A competing hypothesis is that regional divergence is related to glob-
alisation: India’s growth has occurred at the same time as a sharp in-
crease in the country’s openness to trade. From 1990 to 2008, imports 
of goods and services as % of GDP increased from 8.6 to 28.0.1 
Hence, for India, increased openness and growing regional disparities 
coincided in time, and some authors (e.g. Daumal 2010, see discussion 
in section 2) have argued that there is a causal relationship: openness 
promotes inequality. From the literature in the field, however, it is nei-
ther theoretically clear nor empirically confirmed that increased open-
ness will create more regional inequality. This ambiguity is confirmed 
in the recent survey of the literature by Brülhart (2010, see also Mel-
chior 2009a), who concludes “Whether trade liberalisation raises or 
lowers regional inequality therefore depends on each country’s spe-
cific geography”.   
 
                                                 
*  The paper is written as a contribution to the project GRANITE Phase 2 (Grassroots 
reachout and networking in India on trade and economics), undertaken jointly by the 
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, Oslo, Norway and CUTS, Jaipur, India dur-
ing 2007-2010. Financial support from the Royal Norwegian Embassy in New Delhi is 
gratefully acknowledged. I thank Karl Rich for comments to an earlier draft, and Jan Ris-
vik for proofreading the manuscript. All views expressed are those of the author, who is 
also responsible for any remaining errors. 
1  Based on data from World Bank: World Development Indicators Online, downloaded 
June 2010. The corresponding increase for exports of goods and services as % of GDP 
was from 7.1% in 1990 to 22.7% in 2008. 
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This should not be misunderstood to say that the outcome is arbitrary 
or that theory has nothing to say: the point is that the analysis has to 
be sufficiently specific to account for the specific geography of a 
country (and its surroundings). Hence, we have to drop the common 
(and often implicit) assumption that openness should affect regional 
inequality in the same way in a variety of different situations. For ex-
ample, according to the new economic geography framework, one 
might expect more agglomeration for intermediate levels of trade 
costs. While this may be plausible as part of the general theory, it ab-
stracts from the specific geography of countries and regions, and 
along with e.g. Bosker et al. (2010), also following the request for 
higher-dimensional modelling by Fujita and Mori (2005); see also 
Combes et al. (2008), we argue that it is necessary to “add geography 
to the new economic geography”. While two-region models are useful 
in order to examine general principles and model properties, we need 
an intermediate theoretical level with more specificity in order to link 
theory to empirical analysis. For this reason, multi-region models are 
necessary if we are to gauge the spatial impact of international trade 
for a particular country or region. Melchior (2009a, b) shows that for 
Europe, the impact of openness on regional patterns varies across dif-
ferent reforms. For example, East-West integration has a different im-
pact compared to WTO (World Trade Organization) liberalisation or 
reduction in transport costs. For China, growth has disproportionally 
benefited the coastal provinces and Melchior (2010b) shows that in 
this case, it may indeed be the case that openness contributed to more 
regional inequality. 
 
In order to examine the spatial impact of trade openness in India, our 
approach is therefore one of “geographical economics”: We develop a 
world trade model with 166 countries and regions and simulate the 
impact of changes in trade costs. In this model, large countries such as 
India and China are subdivided into regions, and we obtain predictions 
about how trade liberalisation affects regional disparities, that are later 
used to support the empirical analysis. 
 
For the world in general and for India in particular, an important mes-
sage from recent research is that trade costs are high and include 
transport and distribution costs that are often much higher than tariffs 
and “political” trade obstacles (see e.g. Irarrazabal et al. 2010, Ander-
son and van Wincoop 2004). In the analysis, we take into account in-
frastructure as well as standard trade policy barriers. A core message 
from the analysis is that for India, trade costs due to bad roads may be 
as important as international trade tariffs, and both have to be reduced 
in order to increase trade. For large countries such as India, inter-state 
trade is at least as important for welfare as international trade, and for 
this reason India needs a trade and infrastructure policy that also ad-
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dresses the country’s domestic market and trade, and not only interna-
tional trade.  
 
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 presents up-to-date evidence 
on regional disparities in India and surveys some earlier research in 
the field. In section 3, we motivate why inter-state trade in India 
should be part of the analytical framework and survey some relevant 
evidence concerning domestic trade barriers in India. Section 4 pre-
sents the theoretical framework, the simulation scenarios, and the nu-
merical modelling results. Section 5 presents data and compares simu-
lation results with GDP growth as well as sector-level growth at the 
state level in India. Section 6 summarises main findings and implica-
tions. In Appendix A, more details of the model are presented. 

2. Regional inequality, openness and 
the economic geography of India:  
the background 
Along with faster economic growth, India’s post-reform period after 
1991 has featured accelerating regional disparities (see e.g. Rao et al. 
1999, Kurian 2000, Sachs et al. 2002). Figure 1 shows population-
weighted Gini coefficients in GSDP (Gross State Domestic Product) 
per capita across states for the period 1993-2007.2 
 
Figure 1: Regional income inequality in India 1993-2007
Population weighted Gini coefficients for inequality in  GSDP per capita 
across states, with base years 1993/94 (left) and 1999/00 (right)
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Indian GSDP data are available with different base years and we show 
results using base years 1993/94 (for 1993-2002) and 1999/2000 (for 
1999-2007). Observe that not only fixed-price results but also current-
price calculations differ for the overlapping years 1999-2002, and we 
therefore do not mix data from the two series but show them sepa-
rately. We revert to these data challenges in section 5. 
 
                                                 
2  Data source: MOSPI/CSO (Ministry of Statistics and Programme Implementation, Central 
Statistical Office), data on State Domestic Product (State Series), available at 
http://mospi.nic.in . Observe that India’s fiscal year runs from April to March, so e.g. 
2007 on the horizontal axis is shorthand for April 2007-March 2008.    
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The trend in regional inequality is unambiguous: there was a continu-
ous increase from 0.20 in 1993/1994 to 0.26 in 2007/2008. In 2007, 
India was at the same level as China. Until recently, China was far 
ahead of India in terms of inter-provincial inequality, but with ine-
quality after 2003 falling in China (see Melchior 2010a) and still ris-
ing in India, the levels of regional inequality in the two giant nations 
were similar in 2007. Regional disparities in China are strongly re-
lated to a coastal-inland divide, with faster growth in south-east 
coastal provinces, and can therefore be related to the coastal areas’ 
advantages in terms of access to foreign markets (ibid.).  
 
A similar coastal-inland divide may to some extent be observed in In-
dia. The colonial era promoted the development of ports such as Cal-
cutta, Bombay and Madras (now Kolkata, Mumbai and Chennai), but 
during the post-colonial pre-reform period up to 1991, the so-called 
Freight Equalisation Policy of 1956 (see Chakravorty and Lall 2007) 
contributed to reducing spatial inequality in development. As part of 
India’s reforms, these policies were abandoned. Chakravorty and Lall 
(2007) conclude that during the post-reform period up to 1998, in-
vestment in India was disproportionately located in coastal areas. 
Hence, there is a coastal-inland issue for India. This is however by far 
not as strong and dominating as in China.3 As a preliminary illustra-
tion using state-level data, Figure 2 shows per capita GSDP growth in 
fixed prices in Indian states during 1993-2007, using the same data 
source as above.  
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Figure 2: Growth rates, GSDP per capita in fixed prices 1993/94 to 
2007/08. Darker areas=higher growth. 
                                                 
3  In the south of India, all states have a coastline so the coastal-inland distinction is not very 
useful unless the analysis is undertaken at a more disaggregated level. 
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Average annual growth rates in the diagram range from 2.6% 
(Madhya Pradesh) to 10.4% (Puducherry).4 As seen from the diagram, 
some coastal areas had higher growth but there was no unambiguous 
and strong coastal-inland divide. The economic geography of India 
may therefore be more complex than that of China, and in this paper 
we search for mechanisms that could affect the spatial economic dis-
tribution.  
 
India’s trade openness increased from 20% in 1993 to 51% in 2008, 
measured as exports+imports of goods and services as % of GDP.5 
After 1991, there was a substantial reduction in tariffs as well as non-
tariff barriers for manufacturing (see e.g. Das 2003). This fast increase 
in openness occurred simultaneously as the surge in regional inequal-
ity and an issue is therefore whether increased openness is a reason for 
larger inequality. Some authors have regressed measures of regional 
inequality on openness for India as a whole and concluded that there is 
a causal relationship. Daumal (2010) uses data for 1980-2003, i.e. 
with only 24 observations, but using time-series econometric methods 
she concludes that openness drives inequality. Milanovic (2005) ob-
tains a similar conclusion using panel data for five countries including 
India. The causal mechanism involved in these results is, however, not 
so clear. Is it because border regions grow faster; because openness 
interacts with the technological capacity or factor endowments of the 
regions; or what?  
 
Since India’s trade liberalisation has focused particularly on manufac-
turing, some authors have studied how trade liberalisation may affect 
regional inequality indirectly via manufacturing. Using state-level data 
for 1980-2000, Barua and Chakraborty (2010) found that regional ine-
quality in GSDP per capita and manufacturing output were correlated 
and both increased until 1997. Bhattacharya et al. (2004) also find that 
manufacturing is an important driver of regional disparities. Aghion et 
al. (2008) arrive at a similar conclusion; with the qualification that lib-
eralisation had a more positive impact on manufacturing output in pro-
employer that in pro-worker states. Mitra and Ural (2007) found that 
trade liberalisation led to increased productivity but the impact was 
more pronounced in states with more labour market flexibility. Some 
of these contributions support the view that liberalisation could create 
more regional inequality in manufacturing output and this could con-
tribute to income inequality more generally. On the other hand, 
Mishra and Kumar (2005) found that trade liberalisation led to higher 
wages in sectors using more unskilled labour, and this could contrib-
ute to less inequality. Hence, the evidence is ambiguous.  
                                                 
4  With current prices, the range of growth rates is 7.7-16.4, and the spatial pattern is similar. 
5  Source: World Bank: World Development Indicators online. 
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A problem in the study of openness and regional inequality in India is 
that state-level data on international trade do not yet exist. Some au-
thors have tried to get around this problem by using state-level pro-
duction data to construct proxies for state-level international trade. For 
example, if India is an exporter of clothing and a given state produces 
a higher share of clothing than the all-India average, one may assume 
that this state is a net exporter of clothing. Using approaches along 
these lines, Marjit et al. (2007) as well as Barua and Chakraborty 
(2010) construct state-level indexes of trade openness. Marjit et al. 
(2007) find that open states have higher income. However, they do not 
establish a causal link between regional prosperity and trade, and con-
clude this is an important future research agenda. Barua and Chak-
raborty (2010) conclude that increased trade initially caused regional 
inequality in GDP as well as manufacturing, but this effect was damp-
ened over time.  
 
According to this brief survey, current evidence on the potential link 
between trade integration and regional inequality in India is partly 
contradictory, and far from conclusive. Many results are predomi-
nantly empirical in the sense that the exact causal mechanism from 
integration to regional inequality is not fully clear. The purpose of this 
paper is to provide a framework for analysis that makes these links 
clearer, and present some new empirical evidence. 
3. India: Inland versus international 
trade  
For a state in India, trade beyond its territory includes not only inter-
national trade, but also domestic inter-state trade; in India often called 
inland trade. This basic feature of state-level openness is generally 
neglected in the literature, theoretically as well as empirically, and a 
purpose of this paper is to provide a new framework for analysis that 
includes domestic as well as international trade.  
 
In the modern theory of international trade, it is common knowledge 
that firms in large markets and trade blocs may have an advantage due 
to their privileged access to the domestic or regional market. For this 
reason, domestic trade integration in large countries also promotes 
their performance in international markets (see e.g. Martin and Rogers 
1996). In the recent literature on firm-level exports, it has been shown 
that firms start by exporting to a few and often geographically close 
markets. For example, Eaton et al. (2008) show that small French 
firms often sell to one or two export markets and a major export desti-
nation is Belgium. As shown by Ruhl and Willis (2008), new export-
ers start on a smaller scale and are more likely to exit than the more 
established exporters. In the context of India, the implication is that 
exports to neighbour states may serve as a platform to expand to new 
and more remote international markets at a later stage. For India, we 
argue that domestic trade should be part of the research perspective, 
and especially so if we focus on the impact of trade at the state level. 
Using model simulations, we will show that domestic and interna-
tional trade can be complements or substitutes, and the impact of trade 
strongly depends also on the inter-state trade component.  
 
Inland trade is not only a statistical but also a political matter. As 
stated in 2003 by D. C. Pant, Deputy Chairman of India’s Planning 
Commission: “It is ironic that during a period when as a nation we are 
embracing globalisation, we still persist with local protectionism. 
Unless we reverse this process decisively, a day may come when parts 
of our country become more closely integrated with the global econ-
omy than with their neighbouring States. This would place unbearable 
strain on the unity and integrity of our nation.” 6 When visiting India 
in 2004, Japan’s foreign minister referred to statements from her in-
                                                 
6  Inaugural address by Shri K.C. Pant, Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission at a Na-
tional Seminar on “India as one Common Market : Prospects and Challenges to Trade & 
Services” at Kolkata on 16 January 2003. 
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dustry telling that  “shipping of goods from Japan to India took just 
two hours by air but takes up to 150 days to transport goods across 
state borders in India” (Tribune News Service, New Delhi, 13 August 
2004). In 2003, the cost of shipping a 20-feet container from Delhi to 
Mumbai was $405, while from Mumbai to Singapore the cost was 
$220. In this example, therefore, inland haulage costs accounted for 
64 per cent of the total transport cost of exporting goods.7 In the re-
search literature, the importance of inland transport costs has also 
been confirmed by De (2009). 
 
How large is inter-state trade in India, and how large is the interna-
tional trade of each Indian state? In 2001, the government-appointed 
National Statistical Commission requested better statistics for inland 
trade as well as state-level exports (MOSPI 2001, Chapter 6). In 2009, 
the Directorate General of Commercial Intelligence and Statistics 
(DGCI&S) in Kolkata was still working to prepare such data but it 
was uncertain when it would become available. For this reason, cur-
rent evidence on state-level trade is still limited and indirect. Compar-
ing to Europe, where intra-European trade has been a core issue for 
decades, it is a paradox that for India, we essentially do not know 
much about it. 
 
The presence of large income gaps within India suggests that the 
country is far from fully integrated. Labour migration is limited (see 
e.g. Munshi and Rosenzweig 2009), and price disparities are still con-
siderable (see e.g. Deaton 2008) in spite of some recent convergence 
(Virmani and Mittal 2006, Das and Bhattacharya 2005). There are 
considerable inter-state differences in taxation that impede integration 
(see e.g. Rao and Shah 2009). The planned General Sales Tax (GST) 
will replace the current Central Sales Tax on inter-state trade. The 
GST reform will go some way toward a common VAT (value added 
tax) but only partially, since important regulatory differences will re-
main. According to Das-Gupta (2003), fiscal checkpoints still impede 
inter-state trade, but their fiscal role is still significant and their re-
moval should therefore be part of a broader tax reform. Even if the so-
called octroi (local sales tax at the municipal level for goods that enter 
into an area) has been abandoned in most states, it still exists and in 
the current planning of the GST, Makarashtra has refused to give up 
the octroi for fiscal reasons.8 
 
Domestic trade costs in India also depend on infrastructure, and the 
level of infrastructure varies strongly across Indian states (see e.g. Ba-
rua and Chakraborty 2010, Kurian 2001, Debroy and Bhandari 2002, 
                                                 
7  Business Standard, 9 September 2003: “Inland haulage costs hit trade”, New Delhi.  
8  The Financial Express, 13 February 2010: “Maharashtra octroi still hurdle in GST road 
map”, at www.financialexpress.com.  
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pp. 23ff.). Conway et al. (2008) found that industry regulation varied 
considerably across Indian states, and the more liberal and pro-
competitive states were also more successful in infrastructure provi-
sion. Some studies indicate that weak infrastructure is a major bottle-
neck for manufacturing growth (Barua and Chakraborty 2010; Hulten 
et al. (2006); see also Panagaryia 2007). 
 
According to Lall and Rastogi (2007), investment in infrastructure has 
not matched GDP growth after 1991, so its share in GDP has been fal-
ling. For this reason, there are doubts about whether India has invested 
sufficiently in infrastructure. While India developed her railway sys-
tem at an early stage, the share of road transport in total freight vol-
umes has increased from about 10% in the early 1950s to more than 
60% today, with a further expected increase to 85% (Sriraman et al. 
2006). The complexities of Indian road transport are described in De-
broy and Kaushik (2002), including the various checks and taxes 
faced by the trucks passing though India. For example, a truck ride 
from Calcutta to Chennai could take an estimated 143 hours, of which 
the moving time is only 38%. For the actual moving time, speed varies 
due to variable road quality and the incidence of congestion, for Cal-
cutta-Chennai it was estimated to a modest 34 kilometres per hour. 
Conditions may have changed since then but we have no more recent 
evidence. Substantial investments in infrastructure are planned, but it 
will take considerable time and resources to modernise the road and 
infrastructure system of India (Rastogi 2008). 
 
Reducing trade costs is not only a matter of physical infrastructure 
such as roads and ports, but also logistics in a wider sense. Severe 
limitations in India’s transport and logistics systems were identified 
by Peters (1990), and although some of these have been remedied, 
others remain. India was a slow starter with respect to containerisa-
tion, and since the early 1990s (see e.g. World Bank 1994) there have 
been doubts as to whether infrastructure investments have been too 
small to keep up with increased demand for transport services. Effi-
cient logistics can hardly be developed without strong private partici-
pation, and a regulatory system that fosters competition and efficiency 
(rather than monopoly rents and inefficiency) is therefore vitally im-
portant. According to Chandra and Jain (2007), transportation consti-
tutes 40% of total logistics costs in India, with warehousing, packag-
ing and losses (26%), inventory (24%) and order processing and ad-
ministrative (10%) making up the rest. Warehousing is typically 
small-scale and low-tech; which is particularly detrimental to the food 
sector that – given the Indian climate – urgently needs cold chains.  
 
One the whole, the indirect evidence suggests that the extent of inter-
state trade integration in India is limited by weak infrastructure and 
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logistics, fiscal barriers and checkpoints, in addition to regulatory dif-
ferences. The severity of the problem is however hard to assess, and 
more data, research and knowledge are needed. In our further analysis, 
the extent of inter-state integration in India therefore deserves to be an 
important component. While still missing direct evidence on the mag-
nitude of inland trade, the numerical model simulations will shed light 
on the role that such trade may play “behind the scene” and provide a 
new conceptual framework where inland and international trade are 
both included. 
 
4. Model and scenarios 
For our “geographical economics” approach, we need a model which 
is tractable and has sufficient dimensionality. Modelling issues are 
discussed in greater detail in Melchior (2009a, 2010a) and we provide 
here an overview of some considerations underlying our model 
choice. Some of the algebra of the model is shown in Appendix A. 
4.1. The modelling approach 
A technical challenge with New Economic Geography (NEG) models 
is they generally have multiple equilibria. While this is tractable in 
two-region models, it is a greater challenge in multi-region models 
where the number of potential equilibria may be daunting. Bosker et 
al. (2010) note that asymmetries in geography (region size, trade costs 
etc.) may reduce the number of equilibria, but one can never know for 
sure “whether or not the equilibrium solution found is unique or not” 
(ibid., 802). A second challenge of the NEG approach is that the result 
is often “catastrophic agglomeration”. For example, Bosker et al. 
(2010) simulate the impact of European integration and find that with 
internationally mobile labour, all economic activity is concentrated in 
the Île-de-France region. In order to avoid these problems of the NEG 
approach in a multi-regional setting, we follow some other authors 
(see e.g. Behrens et al. 2005, 2007) by taking one step back to the 
New Trade Theory (NTT) approach; e.g. dropping ad hoc migration 
dynamics, and use a static trade model.  
 
In models of the new trade theory (NTT) and the new economic geog-
raphy (NEG), agglomeration mostly takes the form of specialisation in 
production: There is a ”modern” or “manufacturing” sector with 
economies of scale and imperfect competition that is concentrated in 
the advantaged country or region (see e.g. Krugman 1991, Krugman 
and Venables 1995). Behrens et al. (2005, 2007) and Melchior (2000) 
use a multilateralised version of Krugman’s “home market effect” 
model in their modelling. This has a compact matrix form solution 
(see e.g. Melchior 1996) and some analytical results are possible; and 
for numerical simulation it is computationally simple. There are two 
reasons why we do not follow this approach here, the first being that 
the standard assumption of sector diversification is problematic in a 
multi-region framework. In order to ensure factor price equalisation, 
all regions or countries have to produce a homogeneous “numeraire” 
good. As shown in Melchior (2000, 2009a), this is only sustainable for 
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a limited range of parameter values, and with multiple regions it im-
plies a severe limitation of the analysis.  
 
A second argument against the “home market effect model” is based 
on empirical research: Instead of factor price equalisation and sector 
agglomeration we may empirically have less sector specialisation and 
more wage inequality.  For India, the principle finding of Lall et al. 
(2003) is that industrial diversity is the only economic geography 
variable that positively affects the efficiency of firms across India’s 
states. According to their results, growth is not fostered by spatial 
concentration of industries due to differences in market access. Ac-
cording to the authors (ibid., 31) this “raises serious questions about 
the validity of much theorizing on localization economies”.  This 
strengthens the case for a model that does not rely on sector speciali-
sation and agglomeration. Already in Krugman (1980), however, it 
was observed that the advantage of better market access may show up 
in wage differences rather than agglomeration of production, and the 
empirical survey of Head and Mayer (2004) suggests that the “wage 
version” of NTT/NEG models actually finds more support in the em-
pirical literature. With this motivation, Melchior (2009a) develops a 
multi-region model where advantages of better market access show up 
in wage differences rather than sector specialisation. In Melchior 
(2009a, b) this “wage gap model” is used in the analysis of regional 
disparities in Europe. An advantage of the wage gap model is also that 
we do not have to handle the issue of complete specialisation, which 
may be a technical challenge in a multi-regional setting. 
 
For the analysis of India (and China), we also face the problem that 
some regions have – internationally compared – extremely low wage 
and productivity levels. Comparing Uttar Pradesh with Germany 
without correcting for this difference could give the former too much 
of a “home market advantage”. We therefore develop a modified 
model with the following characteristics: 
 
– There are two factors of production; capital (K) and labour (L). 
We may think of K as human or physical capital. These factors 
are used in the production of two sectors. 
– There is a traded sector with product differentiation, economies 
of scale and monopolistic competition, along the lines of stan-
dard NTT/NEG models but with endogenous factor prices as in 
Markusen and Venables (2000).  
– There is a non-traded sector with homogeneous goods or ser-
vices. The assumption of no trade in this sector plays two roles: 
It eliminates any sector specialisation, so all trade is intra-
industry and total trade for each country or region is balanced. 
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For the non-traded sector, prices vary across regions/countries, 
depending on factor endowments and prices.  
 
We may think of this as a “modified Balassa-Samuelson model”, re-
ferring to the standard model of international price differences based 
on Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964). The modification is that the 
traded sector has imperfect competition, so we add NTT/NEG effects 
on top of the “neoclassical” properties that follow from factor en-
dowments. For this reason, prices for traded goods also differ across 
countries even if trade costs are equal, contrary to the Balassa-
Samuelson model. 
 
Using the results of Caselli (2005), we find that empirically observed 
K/L ratios are very highly correlated with GDP per capita across 
countries and as an approximation, we therefore use data on GDP per 
capita (scaled) as a proxy for the K/L ratio. Missing data for the active 
working population, we use population as a proxy for the labour stock 
L. We thereby implicitly assume that the workforce has the same 
share of the population in all countries and regions; which is inaccu-
rate but acceptable for the theoretical exercise to be undertaken here.  
 
Given that per capita income varies strongly across regions and coun-
tries, the K/L ratios do as well. This creates large productivity differ-
ences across countries/regions: with the chosen model parameters, 
poor regions will have a “too small” capital stock and be less produc-
tive compared to the rich ones. We generally assume that the traded 
sector is more K-intensive than the non-traded sectors. Factor prices in 
each country or region are endogenous. The assumption of a non-
traded sector simplifies the model considerably so we can solve ex-
plicitly and analytically for the quantity of production in the non-
traded sector, the number of firms in the traded sector, and the 
wage/capital rent ratio. What remains to be determined are the wage 
levels and the sales across markets for the traded sector. This is de-
rived by means of numerical simulations. The model is well-behaved 
and we obtain a positive solution with sufficient accuracy.  The model 
is technically documented in Appendix A, and further in Melchior 
(2010).  
 
For the analysis, the main parameters of interest are the factor prices 
of each region. In our base case, the model predicts wage levels that 
are 99.9% correlated with empirically observed GDP per capita. This 
is by assumption due to our method for calibration of K and L, and the 
main determinants of factor prices are the factor stocks. Our interest 
lies however beyond this: we study the modification in factor prices 
and trade due to changes in market integration. In order to do so, we 
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consider how factor prices, trade and welfare are changed in different 
scenarios, compared to a base case. 
4.2. Scenarios and trade costs 
If trade integration is to have a geographical impact across Indian 
states, a crucial distinction is between spatial and non-spatial trade 
costs. This distinction was known in the early gravity literature and 
was reintroduced more recently by Melchior (2000), Behrens et al. 
(2005, 2007) and also Bosker et al. (2010). Spatial trade costs depend 
on distance, whereas non-spatial trade costs do not. As an example of 
the former, we may think of road transports, where the fixed cost ele-
ment is limited and the cost depends strongly on distance. At the other 
end of the scale we may think of a tariff that is equal across trading 
partners and therefore has no spatial dimension. From this we might 
think that transport costs are spatial and trade policy barriers non-
spatial, and for the sake of language simplification we may sometimes 
refer to the spatial trade costs as transport costs. This is partly appro-
priate but not fully accurate. For example, a larger part of the total 
transport cost for shipping is related to logistics and capital costs, so 
the distance gradient is weaker than for road transports. Trade policy 
barriers such as product standards may be more similar among 
neighbour countries, and countries in a geographical region may be 
more integrated; thereby creating a spatial gradient also for trade pol-
icy costs. Hence, it is an empirical issue which trade costs are spatial 
and which are not. Our ambition here is not to sort out this empiri-
cally, but to undertake stylised theoretical experiments where the vari-
ous trade cost elements are changed ad hoc.  
 
In the simulation model, we subdivide India, China, USA and Russia 
into regions. The map is deliberately more detailed for Asia, and more 
aggregated for other regions: For Africa and South America, which 
both have lower economic weight and are more remote, we reduce the 
number of units by merging some countries into country groups.9 The 
country and region aggregation is shown in Appendix B. There are 
166 countries/ country groups/ regions. For more discussion, see Mel-
chior (2010), where the same model and country aggregation are ap-
plied.  
 
For exports from an Indian state to another destination, we always in-
clude spatial as well as non-spatial trade costs. This applies also to 
exports to another Indian state: non-spatial trade costs may then be 
thought of as non-geographical transaction costs related to trade, while 
the spatial element will reflect transport costs and other spatially de-
                                                 
9  In these cases we allow non-zero trade costs within the country groups; see Appendix A 
and Melchior (2010). 
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pendent costs. We generally assume that the non-spatial trade cost 
within India, China, Russia and USA is lower than the corresponding 
non-spatial international trade cost. We also take into account a num-
ber of regional trade blocs, where this “non-spatial” trade cost may be 
lower between participating countries. For technical simplicity, any 
trade cost is assumed to be a real trade cost and not a tax. Hence, in 
the model, there are no revenue effects. 
 
The spatial trade cost is a function of distance dij between two units i 
and j. In order to avoid unduly large spatial trade costs for remote des-
tinations, we use the exponential transformation dij0.4 as the bases for 
calculating international spatial trade costs. We then scale this trans-
formed distance variable up or down, usually with the assumption that 
the maximum trade costs should never exceed 100%. 
 
We simulate six different scenarios, where trade costs are changed and 
we examine the impact across regions. In Table 1 we show the aver-
age level of trade costs faced by India’s states in the different scenar-
ios, differentiated into spatial and non-spatial, inter-state and interna-
tional, trade costs. All figures are simple averages across Indian states. 
In the column to the far right we also show the average total trade 
costs, including spatial as well as non-spatial trade costs in all mar-
kets. For each scenario, we have indicated in bold the component of 
trade costs that has been changed compared to the base case scenario. 
 
Table 1: Average trade costs for Indian states in different scenarios 
Simple averages across states, in % 
Spatial Non-spatial 
Inter-
state 
Inter-
national 
Inter-
state 
Inter-
national Scenario 
f(dij-India) f(dij) tIndia t 
Total 
Base case 17.4 31.6 15.0 40.0 65.0 
Global village 8.7 15.8 15.0 40.0 50.4 
WTO 17.4 31.6 15.0 20.0 48.3 
Disintegration (spatial) 34.7 31.6 15.0 40.0 67.9 
Disintegration (non-spatial) 17.4 31.6 30.0 40.0 67.5 
Autarky 17.4 31.6 15.0 1040.0 895.3
Indian growth As in base case 
 
In the base case, the exporters of India’s provinces face on average 
65% trade barriers in their sales beyond the regional home market. In 
the light of WTO liberalisation such a figure may appear high, but re-
cent research confirms that trade costs are generally quite high. For 
example, international trade costs are estimated at 35-45% by Irar-
razabal et al. (2010) and 74% by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004). 
In this light, the level assumed in the model simulations appears plau-
sible. It should nevertheless be added that this is a theoretical model 
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where the purpose is to obtain knowledge about qualitative effects. 
Thus, what matters is the ranking across states and scenarios, and not 
the absolute magnitude. Regarding the relative levels of the different 
trade cost components, our assumptions are ad hoc and a possible ex-
tension in future research might be to provide a better empirical un-
derpinning. 
 
The following scenarios are simulated: 
 
– Global village: In this scenario, we assume that all the spatial or 
geographically dependent trade costs are cut by half. In this sce-
nario, the world becomes smaller and distance matters less be-
cause the spatial component of trade costs is reduced while the 
non-spatial component stays unchanged.   
– WTO: In this scenario, the international non-spatial trade costs 
are cut by half. Trade costs within regional trade blocs, such as 
the EU, are expressed as a proportion of the international MFN 
(Most Favoured Nation) trade costs t and are therefore reduced 
proportionately. Trade costs within India, however, stay con-
stant, so there is a relative reduction in international trade costs. 
– In the light of section 2, we include two scenarios where domes-
tic trade costs within India are increased, in order to demonstrate 
the impact of weaker inter-state trade integration. In the spatial 
disintegration scenario, transport costs within India are dou-
bled, while in the non-spatial disintegration, domestic non-
spatial trade costs are doubled. For India as a whole, the impact 
of these two scenarios is very similar but the geographical im-
pact across states is different, so we therefore include both. 
– In the autarky scenario, we increase international trade costs t 
by 1000% and thereby choke off almost all international trade. 
This scenario may shed light on the gradual opening of the In-
dian market during recent decades.  
– Finally, we include an Indian growth scenario where the capital 
stock of all Indian states is increased by 50%. This is motivated 
by our experience from studies on China: High growth in coun-
tries such as China and India implies that the domestic market 
grows in importance and intra-national trade grows faster than 
international trade, due to a gravity effect (domestic regions are 
closer). This may lead to a fall in the share of international trade 
which may incorrectly be taken as evidence of protectionism. 
Similarly, the share of domestic trade is affected by growth and 
a change in this share is not enough to draw conclusions about 
trade policy or the level of trade costs. In the real world, growth 
has not been proportional across states but we use this assump-
tion in order to show in a stylised way the impact of higher 
growth in India than elsewhere. 
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4.3. Simulation results: Averages for India 
A general observation from the results is that the common impact 
across all states is much stronger than the variation between them. 
This is a first hint that trade integration may not be the major driver of 
regional inequality. Beyond this common impact across states, how-
ever, there are differences across them that are at the focus of the 
study.   
 
Considering the common general impact across states, Table 2 shows 
all-India average changes from the base case in different scenarios.  
 
 
Table 2: Simulated changes from base case to other scenarios: 
Simple average across India’s states 
Change in core variables (%) Change in trade flows (%) 
Scenario 
Wage Price index Welfare 
Intra-
regional 
Inter-
state 
Inter-
national
WTO 0.12 -9.94 6.55 -34 -34 9 
Global village 0.10 -9.20 6.02 -32 -11 3 
Disintegration (spatial) -1.25 1.68 -1.74 11 -31 5 
Disintegration (non-spat.) -1.15 1.55 -1.60 10 -29 5 
Autarky -4.97 43.99 -22.05 404 375 -100 
Indian growth 41.75 -4.34 26.61 82 82 32 
 
 
The nominal wage change also corresponds to the nominal change in 
GDP, and we observe that this is relatively small compared to the 
price index and welfare changes. Hence, the main driver of welfare 
changes is the price index changes, caused by changed factor prices 
and trade costs. Figure 3 shows the average welfare levels:  
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Figure 3: Welfare in different scenarios (base case = 100)
(population-weighted average across Indian states)
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Table 2 and Figure 3 suggest that for income levels and welfare, trade 
is beneficial for India: Autarky is worst, domestic disintegration is 
bad, and international trade integration through the WTO and Global 
village scenarios is considerably better. None of these scenarios, how-
ever, can match the growth scenarios in terms of income and welfare 
gains. The scaling is arbitrary and determined by ad hoc assumptions, 
but the comparison illustrates that investment in human and physical 
capital may be the most important driver of growth in India, and may 
provide gains far beyond radical trade liberalisation. Hence, trade lib-
eralisation is not a panacea for growth even if it may have a positive 
impact.  
 
Each scenario corresponds to a specific pattern of trade flows between 
the 166 units in the simulation. Figure 4 shows the average composi-
tion of trade across Indian states, divided into local sales (within the 
state), inter-state trade (within India) and international trade. Regard-
ing Figure 4, observe that the GDP share of the traded sector is by as-
sumption set at 60%, so the bars in the diagram always add up to 60%. 
Trade shares are measured as imports/GDP and since trade is bal-
anced, the same share applies to exports/GDP. 
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Figure 4: Trade shares of GDP in different scenarios, 
aggregated for all Indian states, for the traded sector
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In the base case scenario, a high 47% of India’s output is internation-
ally traded. The high GDP share for international trade in all scenarios 
except autarky may suggest that international trade costs for India 
might be even higher than applied here, or that other factors are at 
work that limit trade. For the purpose of simulating the qualitative ef-
fects theoretically, the model nevertheless provides an appropriate tool 
and we focus on the ranking across states and scenarios rather than the 
absolute magnitudes.  
 
India’s domestic inter-state trade is a modest 11% of GDP in the base 
scenario; considerably lower than the shares predicted for e.g. China 
(19%) but higher than for the vast territory of Russia (3%). Thus, the 
low K/L ratio as well as small economic size (due to low income lev-
els) reduce the proportion of domestic inter-state trade in GDP.  
 
Using Table 2 and Figures 3-4, we may characterise the scenarios: 
 
– Compared to the base case, autarky chokes off international 
trade, increases domestic (intra-state as well as inter-state) trade, 
cuts nominal wages and leads to a radical price increase and a 
corresponding welfare loss. 
– International trade integration, in the form of MFN-type liberali-
sation (the WTO scenario) or reduced transport costs (the Global 
village scenario), boosts international trade and cuts the price 
level. Nominal wages are only modestly affected so the welfare 
gains are mainly caused by lower prices. Both scenarios reduce 
intra-state sales considerably. In the WTO scenario, inter-state 
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trade also falls sharply, but this reduction is weaker in the Global 
village scenario, where domestic transport costs are also reduced 
and contribute to better inter-state integration. 
– In the disintegration scenarios, inter-state trade is considerably 
reduced but the negative welfare impact is limited due to the 
modest share of inter-state trade. A nominal wage reduction and 
higher prices nevertheless result in a significant welfare loss.  
– The growth scenario leads to an increase in all three forms of 
trade, but weaker for international trade so its share of GDP falls 
to a level far below the base case. The capital stock growth 
boosts nominal wages but due to a higher number of firms, the 
price level falls due to increased diversity and intensified inter-
state trade. The overall result is a strong welfare gain.  
 
Observe the similarity between autarky and the growth scenario with 
respect to trade shares: In spite of their totally opposite impact on wel-
fare, both scenarios lead to an increase in the share of domestic sales. 
In the following section, we will see that the similarity applies not 
only to the all-India average results, but also to the differential impact 
across states. 
4.4. Simulation results: The economic geography of India’s 
states 
Using the simulation results, we are finally able to shed some light on 
the issue about integration and regional disparities. As a first macro-
check, we may calculate population-weighted Ginis for regional ine-
quality as in Figure 1, but now using the simulation results. Figure 5 
shows the results. 
 
Figure 5: Regional inequality in India: 
Simulated changes in Gini coefficient from base case
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Observing that the simulated nominal Gini is about 0.22, these 
changes in the level of inequality are very small. Only the autarky 
scenario actually produces a significant change, suggesting that a pas-
sage from autarky to trade should generally lead to reduced inequality. 
Other changes are very small and suggest that increased trade integra-
tion can hardly be a main cause of increased regional disparities in 
India.  
 
Even if regional inequality is not changed much, there may be changes 
in the geographical distribution of income across states. In the follow-
ing, we use maps to show how these patterns change. Figure 6 shows 
welfare changes due to a change from the base case to autarky.10 In 
Appendix C, we show the underlying figures (welfare levels in all 
scenarios).  
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Figure 6: From base case to autarky: Simulated changes in welfare across 
India’s states. Darker = higher values (i.e. less welfare reduction). 
 
While there is a substantial welfare loss for all states, the welfare re-
duction is weaker in the darker North-South belt which is relatively 
better off in autarky compared to the peripheral states in the North-
West and North-East, which lose more from the elimination of inter-
national trade.  
 
                                                 
10  For all scenarios, nominal and real (welfare) changes are highly (almost perfectly) and 
positively correlated, while these are highly (almost perfectly) and negatively correlated 
with the price index changes. It is therefore sufficient to show one graph for each sce-
nario. 
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For the empirical analysis it is important to observe that the spatial 
patterns in different scenarios are to a considerable extent correlated, 
negatively or positively. Table 3 shows the correlations between wel-
fare level changes in different scenarios. 
 
Table 3: Correlation between predicted welfare changes from base case in dif-
ferent simulation scenarios 
  Disint-N Disint-S Growth Village WTO 
Correlation 0.294 0.927 0.999 -0.562 -0.970 Autarky P-value 0.1083 <.0001 <.0001 0.001 <.0001 
Correlation 1 0.471 0.310 -0.366 -0.214 Disintegration 
- non-spatial P-value  0.0075 0.0894 0.0431 0.2468 
Correlation  1 0.930 -0.802 -0.82 Disintegration 
- spatial P-value   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
Correlation   1 -0.565 -0.970 Growth P-value    0.0009 <.0001 
Correlation    1 0.354 Global village P-value     0.0506 
 
The autarky scenario, shown in Figure 6, is highly, positively and sig-
nificantly correlated with the growth scenario as well as the spatial 
disintegration scenarios. In all these three cases, we obtain a pattern 
similar to the one shown in Figure 6. In the case of growth, the reason 
is that growth makes the domestic market more important and there-
fore benefits areas located more closely to India’s economic “centre of 
gravity”.  
 
The peripheral Indian regions, however, are better off with interna-
tional trade and autarky is therefore highly and significantly correlated 
with the WTO and (to a somewhat lesser extent) the Global village 
scenarios; however this time negatively. Figure 7 shows the welfare 
changes in the WTO scenario.  
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Figure 7: From base case to non-spatial international trade liberalisation 
(the WTO scenario): Simulated changes in welfare across India’s states. 
Darker = higher welfare gain. 
 
Hence, the impact of WTO-type liberalisation is a mirror image of 
Figure 6 for autarky; promoting the peripheral regions in the North-
West and North-East. This is also the reason why autarky leads to 
more regional inequality while the WTO scenario works in the oppo-
site direction. 
 
The spatial impact under the Global village is significantly but not 
very strongly correlated with WTO and the spatial impact is therefore 
different, as shown in Figure 8. 
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Figure 8: From base case to spatial international trade liberalisation (the 
Global village scenario): Simulated changes in welfare across India’s states. 
Darker = higher welfare gain. 
 
Spatial liberalisation also benefits South India to a larger extent and 
renders a mainly triangular pattern, with higher growth in all the three 
corners of the Indian triangle. 
 
Thus, we have derived two partly overlapping but distinct patterns of 
spatial change; one corresponding to Figures 6 and 7, which we may 
call the “Central Cone” pattern, and another corresponding to Figure 
8, which we may call the “triangular” pattern. Neither of these two 
patterns has a very articulated coastal-inland divide.  
 
Among the two disintegration scenarios, spatial disintegration has an 
economic geography impact that resembles the autarky case. The case 
with non-spatial disintegration, however, stands out as the one that has 
the lowest correlation with other scenarios. This is shown in Figure 9. 
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Figure 9: From base case to non-spatial trade disintegration in India: Simu-
lated changes in welfare across India’s states. Darker = smaller welfare 
losses. 
 
Non-spatial trade disintegration tends to break up India into different 
spatial clusters with higher income levels, almost like a chessboard 
pattern. This represents a third pattern of spatial change, distinct from 
the two former, which we may call the “Fragmentation” pattern.  
 
Summing up, the model simulations suggest that trade integration is 
hardly the reason behind India’s recent increase in regional disparities: 
The impact of trade reforms on overall regional inequality is small, 
and to the extent there is an impact, more international trade should 
lead to convergence rather than divergence. In the analysis, we have 
derived three distinct patterns of spatial change; the “Central Cone”, 
“Triangular” and “Fragmentation” patterns. In the following, we shall 
see if any of these are present in the actual regional development of 
India. 

5. Empirical evidence  
Even if the scenarios do not explain the increased regional disparities 
in India, it may still be the case that they explain spatial changes. As 
noted by Bosker et al. (2010), the same level of overall inequality may 
correspond to very different spatial patterns. For example, if economic 
mass is transferred from west to east or from north to south, this could 
hypothetically leave overall inequality unchanged even if there were 
considerable changes in the pattern of economic geography. In the fol-
lowing, we will examine statistically whether simulations can shed 
light on the growth pattern observed in Figure 2. 
 
In the analysis, we face two main problems. The first is related to data, 
and we include a brief cautionary note on the problems involved. A 
second challenge is that while simulations may purify one mechanism 
at the time, real life is more complex and it may be the case that there 
is a dose of all the different scenarios. Indeed, that will be a main con-
clusion: There is not one strong and dominating spatial pattern in In-
dia’s development and therefore not a very articulated change in its 
economic geography.   
5.1. The data 
In Figure 2, we observed that for state-level data on GDP, or GSDP, 
there is a discontinuity from data using 1993/94 as the base year to 
those using 1999/2000. In fixed prices there should indeed be a dis-
continuity but also the nominal data show a jump from the old to the 
new series, with a significant increase for some sectors. Table 4 shows 
the change in nominal values for the overlapping years 1999/2000-
2002/2003. For these four years we have data for 32 states, and 
thereby 4x32=128 observations in each of the two series. In the table, 
the unweighted average is the simple average of percentage changes 
from old to new data across these 2x128 observations, which indicates 
how a regression analysis with state-level data could be affected.  The 
weighted average is obtained by summing all the 128 values in the old 
and new series and calculating the ratio between the two aggregates. 
This takes into account the size of each state and provides an indica-
tion of how all-India totals would be affected. 
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Table 4: Change from old to new data in India’s data on GDP by sector 
at the state level, at current prices for 1999/00 to 2002/03 
Change from old to new series 
(% change) 
 Unweighted Weighted 
State GDP (total) 5.82 5.09 
Selected sectors 
Agriculture 2.40 3.41 
Manufacturing 0.00 -3.83 
Services 10.41 9.37 
- Banking and insurance 2.67 -12.07 
- Transport, storage and communication 6.97 8.81 
- Trade, hotels and restaurants 9.52 11.89 
- Real estate, ownership of dwellings and 
business services 19.32 28.37 
- Public administration 4.70 5.50 
 
Hence, with the new data, there is a 5% jump in nominal GDP, and a 
10% increase for services. For real estate and business services, the 
increase was at 19-28%. For agriculture and manufacturing, the 
change was more modest, and there was even a reduction for manu-
facturing if we use the weighted average. 
 
This data problem is not only related to sectors but also states: For 
GSDP, the increase ranges from +19% (Bihar) to -14% (Goa). It is 
evident that a span of 33%% (from -14 to +19) could severely affect 
results where growth is compared across states. Seven states had in-
creases above 10% (Bihar, Uttaranchal, Assam, Himachal Pradesh, 
Chandigarh, Jammu & Kashmir, Orissa and Punjab). At the other end, 
seven states had increases of less than 2%. 
 
The reason underlying this discontinuity in data is most likely that 
technical methods and data collection practices change over time. 
Similar discrepancies between the 1993/94 series and the older series 
using 1980/81 as the base year were observed by Bhattacharya and 
Sakthivel (2004). Whatever the reason, an implication is that there is 
measurement error in the time series and data from different series are 
not comparable.  
 
Our approach to this problem is to undertake all statistical checks us-
ing three different data sets; (i) data for 1993-2002 using the old se-
ries; (ii) data for 1999-2007 using the new series; and (iii) a combined 
series for 1993-2007 where deflators for the overlapping years 
2000/01 to 2002/03 are average deflators from each series. Hence, se-
ries (iii) involved the data problem we have described, so we use se-
ries (i) and (ii) as a control that results are not spurious. In regressions 
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for GSDP, we also include a variable reflecting the data change.11 In 
spite of such checks, however, we cannot change the data and if the 
data jump reflects that the old series was wrong, it cannot be reme-
died. 
 
A second potential measurement error relates to population data. 
Counting the 1.2 billion people in India is no easy undertaking and 
there is some uncertainty about data, especially for years between the 
censuses. The last census in India was in 2001 and a new one is 
planned for 2011 (see www.censusindia.gov.in). For the years between 
2001 and 2007/8, we have used official estimates provided by Indian 
authorities, but there is nevertheless an uncertainty about these until 
the new census becomes available. Before that, we have no possibility 
to do anything about possible errors that affect the per capita income 
estimates. 
 
In India’s recent growth the services sector has played a prominent 
role (see e.g. Bhattacharya and Sakthivel 2004). Bosworth et al. 
(2007) emphasise that there is also uncertainty about price measure-
ment for services. Together with the data problems described here, the 
implication is that considerable caution is needed about possible data 
inconsistencies that might affect the conclusions.   
5.2. Do the simulations explain actually observed growth? 
While simulations may focus on one shock at the time, several scenar-
ios are likely to be relevant in the real development for India: 
 
– The transition from autarky to trade should be relevant for the 
major trade reforms in 1991 and after. Some of these reforms 
were implemented during the period covered by our data (1993 
onwards), and in this period there could also be a lagged adjust-
ment to reforms undertaken in 1991. 
– The results of the Uruguay Round of the WTO (World Trade 
Organisation) were implemented from 1995 and the WTO sce-
nario could be relevant for this. 
– During the 1993-2007 period, there has been an effort in India to 
improve inter-state integration by means of infrastructure devel-
opment, removal of the octroi and harmonisation of other taxes 
or regulations. The disintegration scenarios should be relevant 
for this. 
– Given the faster growth in India since the 1990s, the growth sce-
nario is certainly also relevant. 
                                                 
11  This is equal to the new/old nominal ratio for each of the years 1999/00 to 2002/03, and 
thereafter remains at the 2002/2003 value for the remaining years 2003/04-2007/08. 
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– Finally, the Global village scenario could be relevant, to the ex-
tent that national and international transport costs or other spatial 
costs have been reduced. In particular, the ICT (Information and 
Communication Technology) revolution has occurred during this 
period and reduced the cost of seller-customer contact and logis-
tics. 
 
From the simulations, we have seen that some of the scenarios are 
similar in terms of their spatial effect, and we have loosely grouped 
them in three patterns; the “southern cone”, “triangular” and “frag-
mentation” images. For this reason, e.g. a transition from autarky to 
trade might not only be negatively correlated with the predicted 
changes in the autarky scenario, but also negatively correlated with 
the growth and spatial disintegration scenarios and positively corre-
lated with predicted changes in the WTO scenario! Based on our as-
sessment of relevance, Table 5 summarises the correlations we might 
expect: 
 
Table 5: Expected correlations between actual growth and model simulations 
Note: Assessments of strength of effects are based on correlations in Table 3. 
Scenarios (predicted changes) 
Central Cone Inter-mediate 
Trian-
gular 
Fragmen-
tation Actual event 
Autarky Growth WTO Disinteg. (S) 
Global 
village 
Disinteg. 
(N) 
From autarky to 
trade --- --- +++ -- -  
WTO liberalisation --- --- +++ -- + -- 
Indian integration -- -- ++ --- ++ -- 
Indian growth +++ +++ --- ++ -- + 
ICT revolution etc. -- -- + -- +++ - 
       
Combined effect  
(assessment) ? ? ? - +(?) ? 
 
For the three “central cone” scenarios, Indian growth has an opposite 
effect compared to the other actual events, so the overall impact is un-
certain. This also applies to the remaining three scenarios, but the cor-
relation with growth is weaker for the Global village and Spatial disin-
tegration scenarios, so for these we have an unambiguous expectation 
about the overall impact, which should be reflected in the correlation 
between model predictions and actual growth. The message from Ta-
ble 5 is that due to above-average growth in India, the spatial impact 
of trade integration is blurred since growth has a spatial impact oppo-
site to that of trade reforms and therefore tends to nullify their geo-
graphical impact. Disproportionally high growth within India turns the 
Globalisation, Domestic Market Integration, and the Regional Disparties of India  39 
trade pattern inward and may therefore counterbalance the spatial im-
pact of international liberalisation.  
 
Proceeding to the data, we use simulation figures for nominal GDP 
growth (and not welfare) since these should correspond reasonably 
well to their empirical GDP counterparts. The prices indexes used in 
the numerical simulations are different from those underlying Indian 
GSDP statistics, and a study of price effect is therefore more compli-
cated and beyond the scope of this paper.    
 
As a first check, Table 6 presents simple correlations between nominal 
(current price) growth in GSDP per capita and the predicted change in 
different scenarios, using the three different data sets.  
 
Table 6: Correlations between growth in GSDP per capita in Indian states 
and predicted change in different model scenarios.  
Note: The number of observations is 29 for dataset (iii), and 30 for datasets (i)-
(ii). P values are reported below each coefficient. 
Scenario 
Dataset Autarky Growth WTO Disinteg. (S) 
Global 
village 
Disinteg. 
(N) 
(i) 1993/94 
-1999/00 
-0.10 
0.5989 
-0.10 
0.5883 
-0.05 
0.7902 
-0.27 
0.1509 
0.53*** 
0.0024 
-0.21 
0.2643 
(ii) 1999/00 
-2007/08  
0.17 
0.3814 
0.16 
0.4112 
-0.23 
0.2244 
0.05 
0.7909 
0.15 
0.4390 
-0.11 
0.5500 
(iii) 1993/94 
-2007/08 
0.04 
0.8399 
0.03 
0.8919 
-0.17 
0.3877 
-0.13 
0.506 
0.41** 
0.0283 
-0.18 
0.3395 
 
In conformity with the predictions of Table 5, the only significant re-
sult is found for the Global village scenario: There is a significant 
positive correlation using datasets (i) and (iii), suggesting that the 
Global village scenario captures aspects of the change in India’s eco-
nomic geography during the 1990s.  
 
According to Table 5, we might also expect a negative correlation for 
the Spatial disintegration scenario. This is “almost” the case with 
dataset (i) since the correlation is negative and the P value at 0.15, just 
slightly larger than the 10% threshold. 
 
Running multiple regressions rather than simple correlations (also in-
cluding the data correction variable in dataset (iii)), the Global village 
scenario always remains statistically significant. In some cases we 
also obtain significant estimates for other scenarios but these results 
are less stable. As an illustration, we show some results in Table 7. 
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Table 7: Regressions with nominal growth in GSDP per capita in Indian states 
as dependent variable, and predicted change in different model scenarios as 
right-hand-side variables.  
Note: P values are reported below each coefficient. ***, ** and *, respectively, indi-
cate significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
Dataset used Variable (i) (ii) (iii) (i) (ii) (iii) 
Intercept -1858** 0.0392 
-419 
0.5320 
-3349* 
0.0932 
-1127** 
0.0154 
-392 
0.2482 
-2484** 
0.0164 
Autarky -65 0.1105 
-9 
0.7666 
-103 
0.2664 Not included 
Growth Not included -647 0.1005 
-170 
0.5658 
-1371 
0.1412 
Global village 597*** 0.0060 
155 
0.3230 
1116** 
0.0186 
618*** 
0.0058 
196 
0.2234 
1293*** 
0.0092 
Disintegration 
(N) 
-326* 
0.0949 
-125 
0.3988 
-660 
0.1314 
-319* 
0.0909 
-151 
0.2897 
-773* 
0.0747 
Disintegration 
(S) 
1669* 
0.0600 
403 
0.5432 
3022 
0.1262 
1765* 
0.0553 
596 
0.3847 
3951* 
0.0650 
Data adjust-
ment variable Not included 
1.88 
0.4641 Not included 
0.93 
0.7283 
R2 0.43 0.14 0.37 0.43 0.14 0.39 
Adjusted R2 0.34 -0.00 0.23 0.34 0.01 0.26 
N 30 30 29 30 30 29 
 
The regressions do not add much to the simple correlations and only 
the Global village scenario remains consistently significant (with data-
sets (i) and (iii)). The autarky and growth variables are “almost” sig-
nificant for 1993-2002; with a negative sign suggesting that trade lib-
eralisation was slightly more important for India’s geography than the 
accelerated growth. A result of some interest, although not very robust 
statistically, is that the sign on non-spatial disintegration is negative 
(suggesting there was integration rather than disintegration), whereas 
the sign on spatial disintegration is positive (which might indicate 
weak infrastructure development unless it is a spurious result due to 
growth).  
 
On the whole, this limited empirical evidence is in conformity with 
our expectation that during the post-reform period, trade liberalisation 
and growth had opposite effects on the economic geography of India 
so that their spatial impacts cancelled out. The only effect that comes 
out relatively clearly in the data is some support for the global village 
scenario. This suggests that reduced spatial trade costs were reduced 
due to better infrastructure or the ICT revolution, and this had a de-
centralising effect in India that is reflected in the observed growth pat-
tern. 
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5.3. Sector-level evidence 
In the model we have used, there is no sector specialisation in trade: 
international trade is just a mixture of differentiated products and all 
of it is intra-industry trade. The GDP shares for the traded and non-
traded sectors are also fixed by assumption. Thus, the model does not 
provide prediction about sector changes or sector-specific patterns of 
trade. As noted in Section 3 and shown in greater detail in Melchior 
(2009a), economic models with trade effects and with wage effects are 
to some extent twins: advantages in terms of market access may show 
up in either way, as trade specialisation or wage differentials. Another 
possibility is that sectors are different in terms of trade costs and real-
life events so that the various scenarios vary in importance across sec-
tors. 
 
With this motivation and as a tentative check, we might therefore also 
consider whether sector-level growth is correlated with predictions of 
changes in GDP from the simulations. A full-fledged sector analysis is 
beyond the scope of this paper but we present here some preliminary 
evidence using data for agriculture, manufacturing and services. Table 
8 shows the correlations between changes in sector shares of GSDP 
with predicted change in nominal GDP in the simulations, using 
GSDP dataset (iii) for the whole period. 
 
Table 8: Correlations between changes in sector shares of GSDP with predicted change in 
nominal GDP in different simulation scenarios. 
Note: ***, ** and *, respectively, indicate significance at the 1/5/10% level. 
Sector Dataset Autarky Growth WTO Disinteg. (S) 
Global 
village 
Disinteg.
(N) 
(i) -0.45** 0.0125 
-0.44** 
0.0162 
0.47*** 
0.0087 
-0.31* 
0.0917 
0.09 
0.6407 
0.04 
0.8202 
(ii) 0.06 0.7709 
0.07 
0.7121 
-0.06 
0.7564 
0.10 
0.6107 
-0.11 
0.559 
-0.04 
0.8499 Agriculture 
(iii) -0.07 0.7015 
-0.05 
0.7793 
0.04 
0.8390 
-0.04 
0.8558 
0.04 
0.8372 
0.04 
0.8278 
(i) -0.16 0.4011 
-0.16 
0.3875 
0.06 
0.7388 
-0.28 
0.1321 
0.37** 
0.0432 
-0.40** 
0.0279 
(ii) -0.18 0.3423 
-0.18 
0.3353 
0.06 
0.7455 
-0.38** 
0.0362 
0.45** 
0.0115 
-0.56***
0.0013 Manufacturing 
(iii) -0.25 0.1936 
-0.25 
0.1897 
0.13 
0.5022 
-0.43** 
0.0208 
0.46** 
0.0123 
-0.58***
0.0010 
(i) 0.48*** 0.0075 
0.47*** 
0.0082 
-0.46** 
0.0115 
0.44** 
0.014 
-0.25 
0.183 
0.34* 
0.0644 
(ii) 0.50*** 0.0044 
0.49*** 
0.0055 
-0.42** 
0.0193 
0.56*** 
0.0012 
-0.41** 
0.0259 
0.55*** 
0.0015 Services 
(iii) 0.46** 0.0125 
0.44** 
0.0158 
-0.35* 
0.0617 
0.52*** 
0.0041 
-0.43** 
0.0189 
0.45** 
0.0146 
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For agriculture, the significant estimates for autarky and WTO for pe-
riod (i) (1993/94 to 2002/03) may suggest that during the 1990s, inter-
nationalisation contributed positively to state-level agricultural pro-
duction. There is, however, also a negative and significant estimate for 
growth in period (i), and a competing and alternative interpretation 
which is more plausible is that growth was accompanied by a decreas-
ing GDP share for agriculture. The results, however, indicate that this 
effect was temporary, since with datasets (ii) and (iii) we do not find 
any significant coefficients in the three scenarios.  
 
For manufacturing, we find positive correlations with the Global vil-
lage scenarios and negative correlations with the two disintegration 
scenarios (insignificant in one case), and the pattern is somewhat 
stronger in the second part of the period. Hence, the results indicate 
that manufacturing development depends on reduced transport costs 
and stronger inter-state integration, and this has become increasingly 
important over time. Again, the insignificant results for the three “cen-
tral cone” scenarios could be because growth and trade integration 
have opposite effects, so we cannot draw a firm conclusion about their 
relevance.  
 
Perhaps the most interesting result in Table 8 is for services: 17 out of 
the 18 coefficients are significant and if we compare with Table 5, we 
find that the sign pattern is fully identical to the growth scenario of the 
simulations. While the growth of services in India is often associated 
with India’s success as an exporter of computer-related services, the 
results here indicate that Indian services growth is at least as much 
driven by domestic market expansion. A closer look at the data also 
reveals that the export-oriented business services constitute a small 
share of GDP (see also Bosworth et al. 2007). Some traditional sectors 
such as trade, hotels and restaurants are larger and also major compo-
nents of Indian growth and the results in Table 8 suggest that services 
development driven by increased domestic demand for such services 
is a core ingredient.  
 
The sector-level evidence presented here is more loosely linked to the 
simulation model since it rules out sector specialisation, but the results 
nevertheless suggest that the model captures important phenomena 
that are visible at the sector level and not at the aggregate (GSDP) 
level. A task for future research is to clarify the causal mechanisms 
underlying this circumstance. 
 
6. Major findings and implications 
For most economic transactions, geography plays an important role: 
the intensity of trade, investment and migration falls with distance. 
For this reason, we find distinct spatial patterns of economic density 
and income distribution within as well as between nations. In Europe, 
income growth recently had a very characteristic V-shaped pattern 
along the east-west dimension, with the lowest growth rates at a longi-
tude passing through Western Germany (and an inverse pattern for 
initial income levels, see Melchior 2009b).  In China, there is a strong 
coastal-inland divide, with coastal regions as hubs for international 
trade (Melchior 2010).  
 
India represents a more difficult case, since there are relatively few 
significant correlations between theoretical predictions and the growth 
patterns of India’s states. With inspiration from the study of China, the 
dilemma was nevertheless (at least partly) resolved: A key observation 
is that disproportionally high economic growth in India automatically 
makes the country more introvert and has a geographical impact that 
resembles that of autarky. Growth in India increases domestic, inter-
state and international trade, but due to proximity to the growing ar-
eas, the former two increase faster and their shares of GDP rise. For 
geography, this has the opposite impact of trade liberalisation and nul-
lifies the geographical impact of globalisation. This may be a reason 
why we do not find spectacular changes in India’s economic geogra-
phy during 1993-2007. 
 
Based on the numerical simulations, we derive three spatial patterns of 
growth that correspond to different scenarios: 
 
– In the “Central Cone” pattern, the divide is between a southern 
cone and the north-west and north-east parts. Autarky and Indian 
growth promote this pattern, and WTO liberalisation is a mirror 
image that reverses it. 
– The second pattern is triangular, with higher growth in the north-
west, north-east and southern corners of the Indian subcontinent. 
This pattern is promoted by global reduction in transport costs 
and other spatially dependent trade costs, as reflected in our 
“Global village” scenario.12  
                                                 
12  The scenario ”spatial disintegration”, where transport costs within India rise, is an inter-
mediate case between the ”Central cone” and ”triangular” patterns. 
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– The third pattern is the “fragmentation” image: high domestic 
transaction costs within India lead to fragmentation with several 
clusters with higher income levels. 
 
For the empirical analysis, a key observation is that some of the major 
reforms affecting India after 1991 should lead to decentralisation and 
a weakening of the Central cone pattern, while faster Indian growth 
should have the opposite effect and strengthen this pattern. It is con-
sistent with this that we find no significant correlations between actual 
GSDP growth and the theoretical predictions from the relevant three 
scenarios. 
 
The “triangular” pattern is more distinct from the impact of growth 
and for the period 1993-2002, we find a positive and significant corre-
lation between actual growth and the pattern predicted by the “Global 
village” scenario. Hence, according to this result, globalisation has led 
to decentralisation in India and a reduction of regional disparities. 
 
In the paper, we have shown that regional disparities in India have in-
creased considerably during 1993-2007 and now approach the level of 
China. The analysis unambiguously suggests that international trade 
integration is not the cause: 
 
– According to the numerical simulations, increased trade integra-
tion, inter-state as well as internationally, should lead to decen-
tralisation and a reduction in regional disparities. This is sup-
ported empirically for the “Global village” scenario. 
– In all scenarios, the common effects across Indian states are 
much stronger than the differences between them.  
 
Thus, trade as such is hardly to blame for increased regional dispari-
ties in India and we should look for other causes. Inter-state differ-
ences in skills, infrastructure, regulations and policies are likely can-
didates with support in the current literature. In this respect, it should 
be observed that in the theoretical analysis here, we assume that In-
dian states are facing the same trade barriers except for the differences 
that follow from their geographical location. Individual state-level dif-
ferences in infrastructure could have a larger impact on regional ine-
quality and also interact with globalisation, but that is another story. 
 
For technical reasons and motivated by the empirical research litera-
ture, we use a model where differences in market access show up in 
the form of wage differences rather than trade specialisation. In the 
empirical analysis, we nevertheless show that the simulation results 
capture important phenomena related to sector specialisation rather 
than aggregate GSDP: 
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– Agriculture faced a positive transitional shock from globalisation 
during 1993-2002. 
– Manufacturing development depends strongly on inter-state in-
tegration in India and the reduction in transport costs. 
– The spatial pattern of services sector expansion conforms well to 
the “Indian growth” scenario and suggests that this sector is 
driven at least as much by domestic demand increases as by in-
ternational high-tech exports and outsourcing. 
 
In the analysis, we have argued that for large countries such as India, 
it is essential that domestic inter-state trade is included, and we have 
presented a new conceptual framework where inter-state trade is in-
cluded along with international trade. While data on inter-state trade 
yet do not exist, the simulations confirm the importance of inter-state 
trade. For India, the model suggests that the current level of inter-state 
trade is low due to India’s poverty and low economic mass, and eco-
nomic growth in India will increase the role of inter-state trade. Our 
survey of the literature suggests that India’s domestic market is still 
underdeveloped and a major effort should be done to harmonise regu-
lations and taxes and improve infrastructure. Some of this can be done 
by the state but the development of modern logistics has to be sup-
ported by a strong and competitive business environment, so regula-
tions should be reformed for this purpose. 
 
In the debate on India’s growth, it has been argued that manufacturing 
expansion is essential to provide enough new jobs and promote struc-
tural change. Our analysis supports, theoretically and empirically, the 
view that inter-state integration in India is essential for manufacturing 
development. In this respect, it should also be recalled that a large 
share (about 6/7) of employment in the Indian manufacturing sector is 
in the small-scale “unorganised” segment (Kotwal et al. 2009, Ray 
2004). When these small firms expand, the first target markets outside 
their own state may not be the USA or EU countries, but their 
neighbour states in India. Domestic market integration in India is im-
portant also as a “training ground” for international exports. There is 
no contradiction between inter-state and international trade: they are 
generally complementary and both contribute to higher welfare. In-
dia’s trade strategy should therefore not only focus on international 
markets, but also on India’s own “single market”.  
 
While our analysis provides a new framework for the analysis of the 
trades of India and other large countries, it is based on a number of 
stylised assumptions and some of these could limit the generality of 
the results. For example, we have assumed that trade may be shipped 
shortest distance with no distinction between road, train or sea freight. 
For India’s northern peripheries, we have not explicitly accounted for 
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natural barriers such as the Himalayas. A possible extension of the 
analysis could therefore be to model the costs of transports and infra-
structure more realistically, based on better data. Another extension 
could be to explore the sector-level effects in greater depth, theoreti-
cally as well as empirically. When data become available, it will of 
course be of great interest to examine inter-state trade in the light of 
our model predictions. The theoretical framework also contains de-
tailed predictions concerning price level changes and that is another 
dimension that could be explored. We have discovered substantial 
measurement errors in India’s state-level data at the aggregate GSDP 
as well as at the sector level, and an interesting issue is whether the 
large data discrepancies for services are caused by better data collec-
tion or changed methods. Price measurement for services is a chal-
lenging task and there is some uncertainty about the quality of current 
deflators (see Bosworth et al. 2007).  
 
This paper is part of a broader effort to make economics more realistic 
by creating models that take into account geography and are more di-
rectly related to empirics (Melchior 2000, 2009a, b, 2010). For India, 
this link between theory and data was harder to find but finally we 
found some tentative evidence that the invisible hand of economics 
works – even there. 
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Appendix A: The simulation model 
Table A1 summarises the main symbols, variables and auxiliary expressions 
in the model: 
 
Table A1: Summary of model symbols and expressions 
Description Symbols/ expressions 
Countries/ regions 
There are N countries or regions.  Subscripts i,j=1,…,N 
Factors of production 
Factor endowments (exogenous) Ki, Li 
Factor prices (endogenous) wi, ri 
Tradables sector with monopolistic competition 
Number of firms in each region/ country ni 
Sales from a firm in region i to region j xij 
Corresponding price pij 
Corresponding trade cost tij≥1 
Elasticity of substitution  > 1 
Aggregate quantity index for consumption in region j (A1)    1
1




  

xX i ijj  
Aggregate price index for consumption in region j (A2)     

   i ijpPxj  1 1
1
 
Unit marginal production cost  iixi rwc ,  
Fixed production costs  iixi rwcf ,  
Total costs of a firm in region i (A3)    iixij ijijxi rwctxfC ,  
Profits if a firm in region i (A4)         Cpx xij ijiji   
Factor use in sector X Kxi, Lxi 
Equilibrium firm size (value expression) (A5)     iixij ijij rwcfpx ,  
Equilibrium firm size (quantity expression) (A6)            ftxj ijij 1   
Equilibrium price  (A7)      ijiixiij trwcp  ,1

 
Production function for implicit “production and 
transport services”  (A8)                  
 1
xixi LK  
Cost function for marginal cost units (A9)              1iixxi wrZc  
Constant in cost function (A10)            11    xZ  
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Table A1: Summary of model symbols and expressions 
Per firm factor demand for K (A11)      







1
i
i
x
i
xi
r
wZf
n
K
 
Per firm factor demand for L (A12)   







i
i
x
i
xi
r
wZf
n
L 1  
Non-traded sector 
Quantity produced = quantity consumed (since it is 
non-traded) Si 
Price Psi 
Factor use in sector S Ksi, Lsi 
Production function for S  (A13)               1sisi LK  
Unit cost function for S (A14)           1iissi wrZc  
Constant in unit cost function for S (A15)          11    sZ  
Factor demand for K (A16)       







1
i
i
sisi r
wZSK  
Factor demand for L (A17)     







i
i
sisi r
wZSL 1  
Aggregate and firm-level demand 
Total income (A18)           iiiii KrLwY   
Utility function (ai = budget share for X) (A19)                 ii ai
a
i SX
1  
Demand for X aggregate (A20)              iixii YaPX
1  
Demand for S (A21)             iisii YaPS   11  
Demand for variety xij (A22)          jjjijij YaPpx
1   
 
The tradable sector is a standard setup with monopolistic competition where 
each firm produces a distinct product variety and there is free entry and exit 
of firms that drive profits to zero. Maximisation of profits (A4) leads to the 
standard mark-up pricing condition (A7): the price is a mark-up on marginal 
costs that depends on the elasticity of substitution σ. Trade costs tij are real 
costs and expressed as a mark-up on marginal costs (A3, A7). Free entry and 
exit imply πi=0 (zero profits) and this leads to the determination of firm size 
(A5, A6). The produced quantity (A6) is independent of factor prices 
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whereas the value of the production of the firm (A5) is scaled proportionally 
with the marginal cost ci, which depends on factor prices wi, ri.  
 Following e.g. Markusen and Venables (2000), we assume that factor 
proportions are the same for marginal costs, trade costs and fixed costs. All 
these costs therefore depend on the cost element ci. With a Cobb-Douglas 
production function (A8), we obtain the standard cost function (A9). Substi-
tuting costs (A9) and firm size (A6) into total costs (A3) and differentiating 
with respect to factor prices, we obtain factor demands from sector X (A11, 
A12).  
 In the non-traded sector, there is perfect competition, no fixed produc-
tion costs, and trade costs do not matter due to non-tradability. Assuming 
Cobb-Douglas production functions (A13), unit costs (A14) follow and the 
factor demands (A16, A17) can be derived. For more detail on this standard 
neoclassical case, see Melchior (2004). 
 Aggregate demand in each sector is Cobb-Douglas (A19-A21) and there 
is a standard CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) demand for individual 
varieties (A22).  
 The first step in the partial solution of the model is obtained through the 
factor market clearing equations, which have the form 
 
(A23) KXi+Ksi=Ki and LXi+Lsi=Li 
 
Substituting the factor demands (A11, A12, A16, A17) into (A23), we obtain 
2N equations with 3N unknowns (ni, Si and wi/ri). But since X is the only 
tradable sector and trade must be balanced, the total value of X production 
must be equal to consumption. This gives (also using A9): 
 
(A24)   iiiixiiiii YawrZfnrwcfn   1,  
 
Substituting for the product niσf in the factor demand equation (A11), the 
factor price ratios cancel out and we obtain: 
 
(A25) 1 iiiXi rYaK   
 
Similarly, we obtain the expression  
 
(A26)   11  iiiXi wYaL   
 
For the non-traded/services sector, production and consumption must be 
equal and price must be equal to marginal cost. From this we obtain, using 
(A21) and (A14) 
 
(A27)   iiiisisii YawrZSPS   11   
 
We use (A27) to substitute for Si in the factor demand equations (A16, A17) 
and obtain expressions of the same type as (A25, A26). Now substituting the 
four expressions for sector factor demand into (A23), we obtain the two 
equations: 
Globalisation, Domestic Market Integration, and the Regional Disparties of India  55 
 
(A28)   iiiiiisiXi KrYaYaKK  1  
(A29)      iiiiiisiXi LwYaYaLL  111   
 
Dividing the two equations by each other, Yi cancels out and we obtain the 
factor price ratio:  
 
(A30) 

i
i
i
i
L
K
r
w
  
 
θ and γ are the consumption-weighted “average factor intensities” for the 
two sectors; with  
 
(A30a) γ=α*ai+β*(1-ai) and  
(A30b) θ=(1-α)*ai+(1-β)*(1-ai). 
 
It is easily shown that θ+γ=1. Observe that total income Yi= wiLi + riKi can 
now, using these results, be expressed as 
 
(A30c) 


 iiii
i
i
i
i
iii
LwLLw
r
w
KLwY 

 







  
Thus, for given Li and θ, total income is proportional to the wage. Since the 
w/r ratio is fixed, external shocks (e.g. trade liberalisation) will scale w and r 
up or down in equal proportions for each country/region. 
 Using (A24) and (A27), we can transform the expressions, put ni and Si 
on the left hand side, and substitute for wi/ri. We thereby obtain the solutions 
for ni and Si.  
 
(A31) 

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(A32) 








1
ii
s
i
i
LK
Z
aS  
 
 For the factor price levels, we cannot find any straightforward analytical 
solution and we therefore use numerical simulation. For each firm in country 
i, sales across all markets must add up to the firm size determined by the 
model of monopolistic competition (A5). This gives N equations of the 
form: 
 
(A33)    1iij xijij wrZfpx  
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For sales in market j, we form the ratio 
 
(A34) 
 
  




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11
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11
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where we have used the demand functions (A22) and the prices (A7) to-
gether with costs (A9). Expressing xijpij as a function of xjjpjj and rearrang-
ing, and using the notation vii=xiipii for the home market sales of individual 
firms, we obtain N equations of the form (for region i) 
 
(A35) 
  

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 

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11
1  
 
Since the factor price ratio is known, we have 2N unknowns; the vii’s and the 
wi’s. Observe that we allow positive trade costs in the domestic market. This 
is for computational purposes: If we merge countries into single units it 
would be unreasonable to assume that trade costs within these units were 
zero. For most countries and regions, however, we will assume that tii=1. 
 (A33) can be expressed in matrix form, as follows: 
 
(A36) 
         111 
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



N
i
i
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Where T is the matrix with (tij/tjj)1-σ as elements and the diagonal matrixes 
have typical elements as shown.  
 Next, sales from all firms and sources in each market must add up to 
total demand (=aiYi). This gives N equations of the form (for market i, after 
rearranging): 
 
(A37) 
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Expressing this in matrix form, we have: 
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(A38) 
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(A36) and (A38) constitute 2N equations with 2N unknowns (vii, wi). In the 
simulations, we use (A36) to express vii and insert this into (A38). In this 
way we reduce the number of equations and unknowns to N.  
 In the numerical simulations, the model parameters are set as follows: 
 
Table A2: Parameter values used in simulations 
Symbol Description Value 
σ Elasticity of substitution 5 
α Capital intensity of traded sector 0.9 
β Capital intensity of non-traded sector 0.5 
a Consumption share of traded sector 0.6 
Li Proxied by population (using 2004 data)  
Ki/Li Proxied using observed data on income per capita 
(scaled) 
 
T Trade costs: defined by scenarios, see text  
 
For more detail about technical issues related to the simulation methods, see 
Melchior (2010). Equation (A38) is a highly non-linear equation system with 
166 unknowns, but its solution turned out to be feasible with a high degree 
of accuracy. Details concerning stopping criteria etc. for the model simula-
tions are available to interested readers upon request. 
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Appendix B: Country and region aggregation 
Units N Note 
Chinese provinces 30 Chongqing is merged with Sichuan since separate data are 
not available before 1997  
Indian states 29 Punjab+Haryana+Chandigarh merged, a couple of small 
territories dropped 
Russia 7 Regions merged into 7 major regions: Northwest, Central, 
South, Volga, Ural, Sibir, East, following public Russian 
subdivision 
USA 11 States merged into 11 major geographical regions following 
public U.S. subdivision 
EU27 27 Individual countries 
Other individual coun-
tries/ units 
50 Afghanistan, Albania, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Bosnia-Herz, Brunei,  Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Canada, Chile, Croatia, Georgia, Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Japan, Kazakhstan, Korea Dem., 
Korea Rep., Kyrgysz Rep., Lao PDR, Macao, Macedonia, 
Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, 
New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Philippines, Serbia Monte-
negro, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Rep., 
Taipei, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Turkmenistan, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Vietnam 
Merged country groups: 
SACU (5) 1 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland 
Other SADC (10) 1 
Angola, Congo, Dem. Rep., Madagascar, Malawi, Mauri-
tius, Mozambique, Seychelles, Tanzania, Zambia, Zim-
babwe 
Western Africa (16) 1 
Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo 
Africa central parts (8) 1 Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Rep., Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Rwanda 
Eastern Africa (8) 1 Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Su-dan, Uganda 
Africa, Mediterranean 
(5) 1 Algeria, Egypt, Arab Rep., Libya, Morocco, Tunisia 
Other Middle East (10) 1 
Bahrain, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, 
Yemen, Rep. 
CARICOM (11) 1 
Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Gre-
nada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago 
CACM (6) 1 Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama 
Andean countries (5) 1 Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela, RB 
Mercosur (4) 1 Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay 
Other central America 
(5) 1 Bermuda, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Haiti, Puerto Rico 
Note: 35 smaller countries/ territories have been dropped from the analysis. 
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Appendix C: Simulation results:  
Welfare levels for Indian regions in different scenarios 
Region Base case WTO 
Global 
village 
Spatial 
disinte-
gration 
Non-
spatial 
disinte-
gration 
Autarky Indian growth 
Andhra Pradesh 20.09 21.34 21.28 19.78 19.78 16.12 25.50 
Arunachal Pradesh 19.06 20.39 20.23 18.70 18.77 14.36 24.08 
Assam 16.66 17.79 17.66 16.36 16.40 12.76 21.06 
Bihar 10.76 11.46 11.39 10.57 10.58 8.42 13.62 
Chattisgarh 17.51 18.64 18.56 17.21 17.20 13.77 22.19 
Delhi 31.21 33.24 33.03 30.69 30.69 24.50 39.53 
Goa 35.03 37.29 37.27 34.37 34.41 27.18 44.33 
Gujarat 23.23 24.70 24.60 22.85 22.87 18.46 29.45 
Himachal Pradesh 23.46 25.03 24.86 23.06 23.06 18.15 29.69 
Jammu&Kashmir 18.03 19.26 19.13 17.70 17.75 13.75 22.80 
Jharkhand 17.17 18.29 18.19 16.87 16.88 13.44 21.74 
Karnataka 20.10 21.37 21.36 19.76 19.79 15.93 25.48 
Kerala 22.07 23.48 23.53 21.66 21.73 17.21 27.94 
Madhya Pradesh 15.61 16.61 16.53 15.36 15.35 12.40 19.80 
Maharashtra 24.21 25.67 25.57 23.87 23.88 19.71 30.76 
Manipur 17.37 18.58 18.44 17.04 17.10 13.11 21.94 
Meghalaya 19.23 20.56 20.41 18.88 18.92 14.62 24.31 
Mizoram 19.46 20.80 20.66 19.09 19.15 14.76 24.59 
Nagaland 18.31 19.59 19.44 17.96 18.03 13.81 23.13 
Orissa 16.57 17.65 17.57 16.28 16.29 12.97 20.98 
Pondicherry 27.91 29.72 29.72 27.39 27.42 21.66 35.33 
PunjabHaryana 25.22 26.85 26.67 24.82 24.85 19.92 31.96 
Rajasthan 16.82 17.90 17.80 16.54 16.54 13.28 21.31 
Sikkim 20.67 22.08 21.92 20.29 20.33 15.80 26.13 
Tamil Nadu 21.84 23.20 23.18 21.48 21.51 17.40 27.69 
Tripura 19.29 20.61 20.47 18.93 18.98 14.72 24.39 
Uttar Pradesh 14.24 15.13 15.04 14.03 14.03 11.42 18.07 
Uttaranchal 19.56 20.86 20.72 19.22 19.22 15.17 24.76 
West Bengal 19.47 20.72 20.59 19.15 19.18 15.42 24.67 
 
 
 
